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Abstract
Quasi-set theory was proposed as a mathematical context to investigate
collections of indistinguishable objects. After presenting an outline of this
theory, we define an algebra that has most of the standard properties of an
orthocomplete orthomodular lattice, which is the lattice of the closed sub-
spaces of a Hilbert space. We call the mathematical structure so obtained
I-lattice. After discussing, in a preliminary form, some aspects of such a
structure, we indicate the next problem of axiomatizing the correspond-
ing logic, that is, a logic which has I-lattices as its algebraic models. We
suggest that the intuitions that the ‘logic of quantum mechanics’ would
be not classical logic (with its Boolean algebra), is consonant with the
idea of considering indistinguishability right from the start, that is, as a
primitive concept. In other words, indiscernibility seems to lead ‘directly’
to I-lattices. In the first sections, we present the main motivations and
a ‘classical’ situation which mirrors that one we focus on the last part
of the paper. This paper is our first study of the algebraic structure of
indiscernibility within quasi-set theory.
1 Introduction
Indiscernibility is a typical concept of quantum physics, and some facts implied
by indiscernibility, as the properties of a Bose-Einstein condensate, have no
parallel in classical physics. Without considering that quanta are indiscernible,
no explanation of colors would be done, no vindication to the periodic table of
elements would result, and, among other things, Planck would not arrive to his
formula for the black body radiation. Some authors have sustained that quan-
tum indiscernibility results from the raise of quantum “statistics” (really, ways of
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counting), while others think that they can explain quantum statistics without
presupposing indiscernibility, but at the expenses of rejecting equiprobability.1
That discussion is still alive, and we have much to do in the philosophical,
epistemological, logical, and on ontological aspects of quantum indiscernibility,
mainly if we agree (with Arthur Fine) that philosophy of science should be en-
gaged with on-going science (apud [14]). This leads us directly to the quantum
field theories, and perhaps more, to string theories and to quantum gravitation.
Acknowledging this naturalistic claim, we shall be here quite modest in dis-
cussing some algebraic aspects of a mathematical theory which was conceived
to deal with indistinguishable objects, the quasi-set theory. Without revising
all the details of such a theory (to which we refer to Chapter 7 of [15]), we
shall keep the paper self-contained so that the reader can understand the basic
ideas, although sometimes in the intuitive sense, and only the really necessary
concepts and postulates are mentioned.
It should be recalled that indiscernibility enters in the standard quantum
formalism by means of symmetry postulates. The relevant functions for sys-
tems of many quanta ought to be either symmetrical or anti-symmetrical, and
this assumption makes the expectation values to assume the same values be-
fore and after a permutation of indiscernible elements. Thus, physicists (and
philosophers accept that) say that “the individuality was lost,” as if there would
be something to lose. In this work, we enlarge our research program of providing
a mathematical basis for quantum theory that takes indiscernibility “right from
the start”, as claimed by Heinz Post [25] (see [15]), with the algebraic discussion
of indiscernibility. All the considerations are performed within quasi-set theory,
which we revise in its main ideas below.
2 Quasi-sets
Quasi-set theory, denoted by Q, was conceived to handle collections of indis-
tinguishable objects, and was motivated by some considerations taken from
quantum physics, mainly in what respects Schro¨dinger’s idea that the concept
of identity cannot be applied to elementary particles [29, p. 17-18]. Of course,
the theory can be developed independently of quantum mechanics, but here we
shall have this motivation always in mind. Our way of dealing with indistin-
guishability is to assume that expressions like x = y are not well formed in all
situations that involve x and y. We express that by saying that the concept
of identity does not apply to the entities denoted by x and y in these situa-
tions. Here, quantum objects do not mean necessarily particles, but ought to be
1This is the particular van Fraassen’s view; for instance, he supposes two particles 1 and
2 in two possible states A and B, and the possible cases are: (i) 1 and 2 in A; (ii) 1 and 2
in B, both cases with probability 1/3 each; (iii) 1 in A and 2 in B; (iv) 1 in B and 2 in A,
both with probability 1/6. According to this author, this way we can arrive at Bose-Einstein
statistics [31]. But the problem is that situations (iii) and (iv) need to be distinguished from
one another, and if the involved quanta are indiscernible, this can be done only either by the
assumption of some kind of hidden variable or by some form of substratum, and we know that
both possibilities conduce to well known problems.
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thought as representing the basic objects of quantum theories, which although
differ form one theory to another ([12, Chapter 6]), have some common charac-
teristics, as those related to indiscernibility (with the exception of some hidden
variable theories, like Bohm’s, which will be not discussed here).2 Due to the
lack of sense in applying the concept of identity to certain elements, informally,
a quasi-set (qset), that is, a collection of such objects, may be such that its
elements cannot be identified by names, counted, ordered, although there is a
sense in saying that these collections have a cardinal. This concept of cardinal
is not defined by means of ordinals, as usual – see below. But we aim at to
keep standard mathematics intact,3 so the theory is developed in a way that
ZFU (and hence ZF, perhaps with the axiom of choice, ZFC) is a subtheory
of Q. In other words, there is a “copy” of ZFU into Q, that is, this theory
is constructed so that it extends standard Zermelo-Fraenkel with Urelemente
(ZFU). In this case, standard sets of ZFU can be viewed as particular qsets,
that is, there are qsets that have all the properties of the sets of ZFU, and we
call then Q-sets. The objects in Q that correspond to the Urelemente of ZFU
are termed M -atoms. But quasi-set theory encompasses another kind of Urele-
mente, the m-atoms, to which the standard theory of identity does not apply.
More especially, expressions like x = y are not well formed when m-atoms are
involved.
When Q is used in connection with quantum physics, these m-atoms are
thought as representing quantum objects (henceforth, q-objects), and not nec-
essarily they are ‘particles’, as mentioned above; waves or perhaps even strings
(and whatever ‘objects’ sharing the property of indistinguishability of pointing
elementary particles) can be also be values of the variables of Q. The lack of the
concept of identity for the m-atoms make them non-individuals in a sense, and
it is mainly (but not only) to deal with collections of m-atoms that the theory
was conceived. So, Q is a theory of generalized collections of objects, involving
non-individuals. For details about Q and about its historical motivations, see
[5, p. 119], [9], [15, Chapter 7], [17], and [20].
In Q, the so called ‘pure’ qsets have only q-objects as elements (although
these elements may be not always indistinguishable from one another), and
to them it is assumed that the usual notion of identity cannot be applied,
that is, x = y, so as its negation, x 6= y, are not a well formed formulas if
x and y stand for q-objects. Notwithstanding, there is a primitive relation ≡
of indistinguishability having the properties of an equivalence relation, and a
concept of extensional identity, not holding among m-atoms, is defined and has
the properties of standard identity of classical set theories. Since the elements of
a qset may have properties (and satisfy certain formulas), they can be regarded
2Since such theories present difficulties due to results like Kochen-Specker theorem and
Bell’s inequalities, so as due to the fact that apparently they cannot be extended to quantum
field theories, we shall leave them outside of our discussion.
3So respecting the quite strange rule what Birkhoff and von Neumann call “Henkel’s prin-
ciple of the ‘perseverance of formal laws’ ”, explained by Re´dei as “a methodological principle
that is supposed to regulate mathematical generalizations by insisting on preserving certain
laws in the generalization” [26]; of course we are ‘preserving’ all standard mathematics built
in ZFC.
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as indistinguishable without turning to be identical (being the same object),
that is, x ≡ y ; x = y.
Since the relation of equality, and the concept of identity, does not apply
to m-atoms, they can also be thought as entities devoid of individuality. We
further remark that if the ‘property’ x = x (to be identical to itself, or self-
identity, which can be defined for an object a as Ia(x) =def x = a) is included as
one of the properties of the considered objects, then the so called Principle of
the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) in the form ∀F (F (x)↔ F (y))→ x = y is a
theorem of classical second-order logic, and hence there can not be indiscernible
but not identical entities (in particular, non-individuals). Thus, if self-identity
is linked to the concept of non-individual, and if quantum objects are to be
considered as such, these entities fail to be self-identical, and a logical framework
to accommodate them is in order (see [15] for further argumentation).
We have already discussed at length in the references given above (so as in
other works) the motivations to build the quasi-set theory, and we shall not
return to these points here,4 but before to continue we would like to make
some few remarks on a common misunderstanding about PII and quantum
physics. People generally think that spatio-temporal location is a sufficient
condition for individuality. Thus, an electron in the South Pole and another
one in the North Pole are discernible, hence distinct individuals, so that we can
call “Peter” one of them and “Paul” the another one. Leibniz himself prevented
us about this claim (yet not directly about quantum objects of course), by saying
that “it is not possible for two things to differ from one another in respect to
place and time alone, but that is always necessary that there shall be some
other internal difference” [21]. Leaving aside a possible interpretation for the
word ‘internal’, we recall that even in quantum physics, where fermions obey
the Pauli Exclusion Principle, which says that two fermions (yes, they ‘count’
as more than one) can not have all their quantum numbers (or ‘properties’)
in common, two electrons (which are fermions), one in the South Pole and
another one in the North Pole, are not individuals in the standard sense.5 In
fact, we can say that the electron in the South Pole is described by the wave
function ψS , while the another one is described by ψN (words like ‘another’
in the preceding phrase are just ways of speech). But the joint system is,
in a simplified form, given by ψSN = ψS − ψN (the function must be anti-
symmetric in the case of fermions, that is, ψSN = −ψNS), a superposition
of the two first wave functions, and this last function cannot be factorized.
Furthermore, in the quantum formalism, the important thing is the square of
the wave function, which gives the joint probability density; in the present case,
we have ||ψSN ||2 = ||ψS ||2 + ||ψN ||2 − 2ReψSψN . This last term, called ‘the
interference term,’ can not be dispensed with, and says that nothing, not even
in mente Dei, can tell us which is the particular electron in the South Pole (and
the same happens for the North Pole), that is, we never will know who is Peter
4But see [6], [7], [8], [15], [18], [20].
5Without aiming at to extend the discussion on this topic here (see [15]), like an indi-
vidual we understand an object that obeys the classical theory of identity of classical logic
(extensional set theory included).
4
and who is Paul, and in the limits of quantum mechanics, this is not a matter
of epistemological ignorance, but it is rather an ontological question. As far as
quantum physics is concerned with its main interpretations, they seem to be
really and truly objects without identity.
In the next sections, we shall discuss from an algebraic point of view some
issues of non-individuality. It should be interesting to recall that the ‘qset’-
operations of intersection (∩), union (∪), difference (−) work similarly in Q as
the standard ones in usual set theories.
3 Algebraic aspects: the lattice of indiscernibil-
ity
Quantum logic was born with Birkhoff and von Neumann’s paper from 1936 [1].
Today it consists in a wide field of knowledge, having widespread to domains
never thought by the two celebrated forerunners. For a look on the state of the
art, see [10]. The main idea is that the typical algebraic structures arising from
the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics is not a Boolean algebra,
but an orthocomplete (σ-orthocomplete in the general case [10, p. 39]) ortho-
modular lattice. We shall see below that in quasi-set theory, by considering
indiscernibility right from the start, a similar structure ‘naturally’ arises. Let
us provide the details before ending with some comments and conclusions.
Now we need of the concept of Tarski’s system and topological space.
Definition 3.1 (Tarski’s Space) A Tarski’s Space is a pair (E,− ) where E
is a non empty set and − be a function − : P(E) → P(E), called the Tarski’s
consequence operator, such that: (i) A ⊆ A; (ii) A ⊆ B =⇒ A ⊆ B; (iii)
A ⊆ A.
Theorem 3.1 In any Tarski’s Space (E,− ) we have that:
(i) A = A;
(ii) A ∪B ⊆ A ∪B;
(iii) A ∩B ⊆ A ∩B;
(iv) A ∪B = A ∪B;
(v) A ∩B = A ∩B.
Proof: See [13].
Definition 3.2 (Closed and open sets) In a Tarski’s Space (E,− ), a subset
A ⊆ E is closed when A = A and A is open when its complement relative to E,
denoted by AC , is closed.
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Definition 3.3 (Closure and interior) Given A ⊆ E in (E,− ), the set A is
the closure of A and the set A˚ = (AC)C is the interior of A.
Theorem 3.2 In any Tarski’s Space (E,− ) it follows that: A˚ ⊆ A ⊆ A.
Definition 3.4 (Topological Space) A Topological Space is a pair (E,− ) where
E is a non empty set and − be a function − : P(E) → P(E), such that: (i) -
(iii) of Definition 3.1 hold plus (iv) A ∪B = A ∪B; (v) ∅ = ∅.
Hereafter, we shall be working in the theory Q, and use the equality symbol
= to stand for the extensional equality of Q. Intuitively speaking, x = y holds
when x and y are both qsets and have the same elements (in the sense that an
object belongs to x iff it belongs to y) or they are bothM -objects and belong to
the same qsets. It can be proven that = has all properties of standard identity
of first-order ZFC. Qsets which may have m-atoms as elements are written (in
the metalanguage) with square brackets “[” and “]”, and Q-sets (qsets whose
transitive closure have no m-atoms) with the usual curly braces “{” and “}”.
We start with the concept of cloud that will to point to the algebraic aspects
whose we are involved.
Definition 3.5 (Cloud) Let U be a non empty qset and A be a subqset of U .
The cloud of A is the qset
A =def [y ∈ U : ∃x(x ∈ A ∧ y ≡ x)].
Intuitively speaking, A is the qset of the elements of U (the universe) which
are indistinguishable from the elements of A. If A is a Q-set, that is, a copy of
a set of ZFU, then of course the only indistinguishable of a certain x is x itself,
thus A = A.
Theorem 3.3 The application6 that associates to every subqset of U its cloud
is a Tarski’s operator and (U,− ) is Tarski’s Space.
Proof: (i) A ⊆ A: Let t ∈ A. Then, by the reflexivity of ≡, we have t ≡ t,
hence t ∈ A. (ii) A ⊆ B ⇒ A ⊆ B: Let A ⊆ B, and let t ∈ A. Then there
exists x ∈ A such that t ≡ x. Since x ∈ B, then t ∈ B. (iii) A ⊆ A: Let t ∈ A.
Then there exists x ∈ A such that t ≡ x. But then there exists y ∈ A such that
x ≡ y. By the transitivity of ≡, we have t ≡ y, hence t ∈ A.
6In Q, the concept of function must be generalized, for if there are m-atoms involved, a
mapping in general does not distinguish between arguments and values. Thus we use the
notion of q-function, which leads indistinguishable objects into indistinguishable objects, and
which reduces to standard functions when there are no m-atoms involved. Thus, from the
formal point of view, the defined mapping may associate to A whatever qset from a collection
of indistinguishable qsets. But this does not matter. As in quantum physics, it is not the
extension of the collections which are important; informally saying, any elementary particle
of a certain kind serves for all purposes involving it. This is the principle of the invariance of
permutations.
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From now on, we shall suppose that U is closed, that is, it contains all the
indistinguishable objects of its elements. Some interpretations linked to physical
situations are possible. For instance, A can be thought as the region where the
wave function A of a certain physical system is different from zero. Another
possible interpretation is to suppose that the clouds describe the systems plus
the cloud of virtual particles that accompany those of the considered system.
But in this paper we shall be not considering these motivations, but just to
explore its algebraic aspects.
It is immediate to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3.4 (U,− ) is a topological space.
Proof:
(i) A∪B = A ∪B: A ⊆ A∪B, so A ⊆ A ∪B. In the same way, B ⊆ A∪B
and B ⊆ A ∪B. Thus A∪B ⊆ A ∪B. Conversely, suppose t ∈ A ∪B, then
there is x ∈ A ∪ B such that t ≡ x. So there is t ≡ x such that x ∈ A or
x ∈ B. In this way t ∈ A or t ∈ B and therefore t ∈ A ∪B.
(ii) It follows immediately from the definition of cloud that ∅ = ∅.
The next definition introduces the lattice operations on subqsets of a qset
U , the universe.
Definition 3.6 (I-lattice operations) Let A,B ⊆ U . Then:
(⊓) A ⊓B =def A ∩B;
(⊔) A ⊔B =def A ∪B;
(0) 0 =def ∅;
(1) 1 =def U .
We note that even if A ∩B = ∅, may be that A ∩B 6= ∅.
Theorem 3.5 For any A,B ∈ P(U):
(i) A ⊓B ⊆ (A ∩B);
(ii) A ⊓B ⊆ A ⊔B;
(iii) If A and B are closed, A∪B and A∩B are closed, and A⊓B = A∩B.
Proof:
(i) Immediate, since A ∩B ⊆ A ∩B (Theorem 3.1 (iii));
(ii) A ⊓B = A ∩B ⊆ (Theorem 3.1 (iii)) ⊆ A ∩B ⊆ A ∪B = A ⊔B;
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(iii) If A = A and B = B, then A ∪B = A ∪B = A ∪B (Theorem 3.4 (i)).
Furthermore, the same hypothesis entails that A ∩B = A ∩B = (Theorem
3.1 (v)) A ∩B = A ∩B. Finally, since A ∩B = (A ∩B) = A ∩B = A ⊓B
(Theorem 3.1 (v) and the hypothesis).
Theorem 3.6 Let C be the qset of all closed subqsets of U . Then the structure
C = 〈C,⊓,⊔,0,1〉 is a lattice with 0 and 1. But, if we consider also the sub-qsets
of U that are not closed, then some of the properties of such a structure do not
hold, as we emphasize in the proof below.
Proof: In this case, for every A ⊆ U holds A = A. Firstly, it is immediate to see
that if U 6= ∅, then P(U) 6= ∅. Furthermore, we can prove that A ∩ (B ∩ C) =
(A ∩B) ∩ C and A ∪ (B ∪ C) = (A ∪B) ∪C for closed qsets.
(a) Idempotency (restricted to closed qsets): A⊓A = A ∩A = A (= A when
A is closed). Also, A ⊔ A = A ∪ A = A (= A when A is closed). If A is not
closed, then A ⊓A = A 6= A and A ⊔ A = A 6= A;
(b) Commutativity (unrestricted): A⊓B = A ∩B = B ∩ A = B⊓A. In the
same way, A ⊔B = A ∪B = B ∪ A = B ⊔A;
(c) Associativity (unrestricted): (we shall be using items (iii) and (iv) of
Theorem 3.1 without mentioning):
(i) A⊓ (B⊓C) = A⊓ (B∩C) = A∩ (B ∩ C) = A∩ (B∩C) = (A∩B)∩C
= (A ∩B) ∩ C = (A ∩B) ⊓C = (A ⊓B) ⊓ C;
(ii) A⊔ (B⊔C) = A⊔ (B∪C) = A∪ (B ∪ C) = A∪ (B ∪ C) = (Theorem
3.1 (i)) A ∪ (B ∪ C) = (A ∪B) ∪ C = (Theorem 3.1 (i)) (A ∪B) ∪ C =
(A ∪B) ∪C = (A ∪B) ⊔ C = (A ⊔B) ⊔ C;
(d) Absorption (restricted):
(i) A⊓ (A⊔B) = A⊓ (A∪B) = A ∩ (A ∪B). But A ⊆ A, so A ⊆ A∪B,
then A ∩ (A ∪B) = A (= A when A is a closed qset);
(ii) A ⊔ (A ⊓ B) = A ⊔ (A ∩B) = A ∪ (A ∩B) = A ∪ (A ∩B) = A, for
A ∩B ⊆ A ⊆ A (= A when A is a closed qset);
(e) The properties of 0 and 1:
(i) 0 ⊓ A = ∅ ∩ A = ∅ = ∅ = 0;
(ii) 0 ⊔A = ∅ ∪ A = ∅ ∪ A = A (= A when A is a closed qset);
(iii) A ⊓ 1 = A ∩ U = A (= A when A is a closed qset);
(iv) A ⊔ 1 = A ∪ U = U = U = 1 (recall our initial hypothesis that U is
closed).
Theorem 3.7 The lattice C of the closed qsets of U is distributive.
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Proof: We shall emphasize those passages which make use of the hypothesis
that the qsets are closed.
(i) A ⊔ (B ⊓ C) = A ⊔ (B ∩ C) = A ∪ (B ∩ C) = [Th. 3.1 (ii)] A ∪ (B ∩C)
= A ∪ (B ∩C) = [Th. 3.1 (iv)] A ∪ (B ∩ C) = (A ∪B) ∩ (A ∪ C) = [Th.
3.1 (iii) and because A ∪ B and A ∪ C are both closed, for otherwise the
equality does not hold] (A ∪B)∩ (A ∪ C) = [Th. 3.1 (ii)] (A∪B)∩ (A∪C)
= (A ∪B)∩ (A ∪ C) = [Th. 3.1 (v)] (A ∪B) ∩ (A ∪ C) = (A∪B)⊓ (A∪C)
= (A ⊔B) ⊓ (A ⊔C);
(ii) (A ⊓B) ⊔ (A ⊓C) = (A ∩B) ⊔ (A ∩C) = (A ∩B) ∪ (A ∩ C) = [Th. 3.1
(ii)] (A ∩B) ∪ (A ∩ C) = [for A∩B and A∩C are closed] (A ∩B) ∪ (A ∩C)
= A ∩ (B ∪ C) = (for closed qsets) A ∩ (B ∪C) = [Th. 3.1 (i)] A ∩ (B ∪C)
= [since A is closed] A ∩ (B ⊔ C) = A ⊓ (B ⊔ C).
This result is not surprising, for we are dealing with set theoretical opera-
tions which, defined on the closed qsets of U , act as the usual set theoretical
properties on standard sets. But if we consider all qsets in U and not only the
closed ones, the distributive laws do not hold, as we can see from the above
proof, which makes essential use of the fact that the involved qsets are closed
(without such an hypothesis, the proof does not follow). Since the correspond-
ing structure I = 〈P(U),⊓,⊔,0,1〉 has similarities with a lattice with 0 and
1, we propose to call it the lattice of indiscernibility, or just I-lattice for short.
Other distinctive characteristics of this “quasi-lattice” are obtained when we
introduce other operations similar to those of order and involution, or general-
ized complement [10, p. 11]. At Section 4, we sum up the main properties of an
I-lattice.
Definition 3.7 (I-order) A ≤ B =def A ⊔B = B.
Theorem 3.8 The order relation obeys the following properties:
(i) A ≤ A and A ≤ A;
(ii) A ≤ B and B ≤ A⇒ A = B (and A = B if they are both closed);
(iii) A ≤ B and B ≤ C ⇒ A ≤ C
(iv) A ⊓B ≤ A, and A ⊓B ≤ B;
(v) C ≤ A and C ≤ B ⇒ C ≤ A ⊓B
(vi) A ≤ A ⊔B, B ≤ A ⊔B;
(vii) A ≤ C and B ≤ C ⇒ A ⊔B ≤ C;
(viii) 0 ≤ A, and A ≤ 1 (recall that 1 = U is closed);
(ix) A ≤ B ⇒ A ⊓B = A.
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Proof:
(i) A ⊔ A = A ∪ A = A, so A ≤ A; and A ⊔ A = A ∪ A = A ∪ A = A, so
A ≤ A;
(ii) A ≤ B ⇒ A ∪B = B, while B ≤ A⇒ B ∪A = A, since A ∪B = B ∪A,
then A = B (A = B for closed qsets);
(iii) If A ≤ B and B ≤ C, then A ∪ B = B and B ∪ C = C, therefore
A ∪C = A ∪ (B ∪ C) = (A ∪B) ∪ C = B ∪ C = C, that is, A ≤ C;
(iv) A⊓B ≤ A iff (A ∩B)∪A = A. But, by Theorem 3.4 (i), (A ∩B)∪A =
(A ∩B) ∪A = A. Equivalently, A ⊓ B ≤ B iff (A ∩B) ∪ B = B. But, by
Theorem 3.4 (i), (A ∩B) ∪B = (A ∩B) ∪B = B = B;
(v) C ≤ A ⊓ B iff C ∪ (A ⊓B) = (A ⊓B) = [Theorem 3.1 (v)] A ∩ B. But
the hypothesis tells us that C ∪ A = A and C ∪ B = B, hence C ⊆ A and
C ⊆ B, that is, C ⊆ (A ∩B). So, C ∪ (A ∩B) = A ∩B, that is, C ≤ A⊓B;
(vi) A ≤ A ⊔ B iff A ⊔ (A ⊔ B) = A ⊔B = (A ∪B) = A ∪B by Theorem
3.4 (i). But A ⊔ (A ⊔ B) = A ⊔ (A ∪ B) = A ∪ (A ∪B) = A ∪ (A ∪B) =
A ∪ (A ∪B) = A ∪B, by the same theorem.;
(vii) The hypothesis says that A⊔C = C and B⊔C = C, that is, A∪C = C,
hence A ⊆ C. In the same vein, B ⊆ C. But these results entail that
A ∪B ⊆ C, hence (A ∪B) ⊆ C, then (A ∪B) ∪C = C;
(viii) 0 ⊔ A = 0 ∪ A = A, and A ⊔ 1 = A ∪ U = U = 1;
(ix) If A ≤ B, then A ⊔ B = B. But this entails that A ⊆ B. Thus
A ∩B ⊆ A ∩B = A [Theorem 3.1 (iii)], that is, A ⊓B = A.
Alternatively, we could define A ≤1 B iff A ⊓ B = A. The theorem above
follows, with the exception of item (ix), which should be substituted by A ≤
B ⇒ A⊔B = B. Really, assuming this definition, we have A⊔B = A∪B = B,
for the hypothesis entails that A ⊓ B = A, that is, A = A ∩B ⊆ A ∩ B by
Theorem 3.1 (iii). So A ⊆ B, then A∪B = B, that is, A⊔B = B. Item (ix) of
the theorem and this result show that A ≤ B iff A ≤1 B.
We have proved that ≤ is both reflexive and transitive ((i) and (iii) above),
but only “partially” anti-symmetric, that is, A ≤ B and B ≤ A entail A = B.
Thus, 〈P(U),≤〉 is a kind of “weak” poset. Since it contains 0 and 1 and
since any two elements of U have a supremum (namely, A⊔B) and an infimum
(namely, A⊓B). I is a “weak lattice”, but of course it is a lattice stricto sensu
if we consider only closed qsets.
The complement of a qset A relative to the universe U is the sub-qset of U ,
termed A⊥, which has no element indistinguishable from any element of A.
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Definition 3.8 (I-involution, or Generalized I-complement)
A⊥ =def U −A.
Theorem 3.9 Let A,B ∈ P(U). Then:
(i) ∅⊥ = U ;
(ii) U⊥ = ∅;
(iii) U −A⊥ = A;
(iv) A⊥ = A⊥ = A
⊥
;
(v) A⊥
⊥
= A (= A when A is a closed qset);
(vi) A ≤ B ⇒ B⊥ ≤ A⊥.
Proof:
(i) ∅⊥ = U − ∅ = U − ∅ = U ;
(ii) U⊥ = U − U = U − U = ∅;
(iii) U −A⊥ = U − (U −A) = A because they are all closed;
(iv) A⊥ = U −A = U −A = A⊥ = A
⊥
. Informally speaking, in U −A there
are no elements indiscernible from the elements of A (according to definition
of cloud). Thus, it is closed, and coincides with A
⊥
= U −A.
(v) A⊥
⊥
= U −A⊥ = U −A⊥ = A (= A for closed qsets);
(vi) A ≤ B ⇒ A ⊔ B = B, hence A ∪ B = B and A ⊆ B. But this implies
that U − B ⊆ U − A, that is, B⊥ ⊆ A⊥. So B⊥ ∪ A⊥ = A⊥, then, by
Theorem 3.1 (i), B⊥ ∪ A⊥ = A⊥, hence B⊥ ⊔ A⊥ = A⊥ or B⊥ ≤ A⊥.
Properties (v) and (vi) of the preceding theorem show that ⊥ is an involution
for closed qsets. For qsets in general, we shall call it I-involution, in the spirit
of the above discussion.
Theorem 3.10 If A,B ∈ P(U), then:
(i) A ⊔ A⊥ = 1;
(ii) A ⊓ A⊥ = 0;
(iii) A ⊔ (B ⊓B⊥) = A (= A for closed qsets);
(iv) A ⊓ (B ⊔B⊥) = A (= A for closed qsets);
(v) (De Morgan) (A ⊔B)⊥ = A⊥ ⊓B⊥;
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(vi) (“Partial” De Morgan) (A ⊓B)⊥ ⊆ A⊥ ⊔B⊥ (equality holds for closed
qsets).
Proof:
(i) A ⊔ A⊥ = A ∪A⊥ = A ∪ A⊥ = A ∪ (U −A) = U = 1;
(ii) A ⊓ A⊥ = A ⊓ (U −A) = A ∩ (U −A) = ∅ = 0;
(iii) A ⊔ (B ⊓B⊥) = A ⊔ 0 = A ∪ ∅ = A (= A for closed qsets);
(iv) A ⊓ (B ⊔B⊥) = A ⊓ 1 = A (= A for closed qsets);
(v) (A ⊔ B)⊥ = (A ∪ B)⊥ = U − (A ∪B) = [Th. 3.1 (iv)] U − (A ∪B) =
[Th. 3.4 (i)] U − (A ∪B) = (U − A) ∩ (U −B) = [Th. 3.1 (ii) and the fact
that the involved qsets are closed] (U −A) ∩ (U −B) = A⊥ ⊓B⊥;
(vi) (A⊓B)⊥ = U − (A ⊓B) = U − (A ∩B) = U − (A ∩B) ⊆ [Th. 3.1 (iii);
equality holds for closed qsets]⊆ U−(A∩B) = (U−A)∪(U−B) = A⊥∪B⊥ =
[previous theorem (iv)] A⊥ ∪B⊥ = A⊥ ⊔B⊥.
The lattice I is I-orthomodular, that is, if A ≤ B, we have that B =
A ⊔ (A ⊔B⊥)⊥.
Theorem 3.11 (I-orthomodularity) For all A,B ∈ P(U): A ≤ B ⇒ A ⊔
(A ⊔B⊥)⊥ = B.
Proof: A⊔ (A⊔B⊥)⊥ = A⊔ (B ⊓A⊥) = A⊔ (B ∩A⊥) = A∪ (B ∩ A⊥) = [Th.
3.1 (iv)] A ∪ (B ∩ A⊥) = (A ∪B) ∩ (A ∪ A⊥) = (A ∪B) ∩ 1 = A ∪B [Th. 3.1
(i)] A ∪B = A ⊔B = (by the hypothesis) B.
Definition 3.9 (Orthogonality) Let A,B ⊆ U . We say that A is orthogonal
to B, and write A ⊥ B, when: A ⊥ B =def A ≤ B
⊥. Furthermore, a collection
S of elements of P(U) is called pairwise orthogonal iff for any A,B ∈ S such
that A 6= B, it results that A ⊥ B.
Theorem 3.12 A ⊥ B iff A ∩B = ∅.
Proof: If A ⊥ B, then A ≤ B⊥, that is, A⊔B⊥ = B⊥. Thus, A∪B⊥ = B⊥, so
A ⊆ B⊥, hence A ⊆ B⊥ = B⊥ [by Theorem 3.9 (iv)], so A∩B = ∅. Conversely,
if A ∩ B = ∅, then A ⊆ B⊥, hence A ∪ B⊥ = B⊥ = B⊥ by Theorem 3.9 (iv),
that is, A ⊥ B.
Intuitively speaking, A ∩ B = ∅ (by the way, this could be an alternative
definition) says that A has no element indistinguishable from elements of B.
In quantum logic, the operations ≤ and ⊥ are usually understood as an im-
plication relation and a negation relation respectively. Thus, we may introduce
the concept of logical incompatibility just using the idea of orthogonality ([10,
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p. 12]): A is incompatible with B iff A implies the negation of B, that is iff they
are orthogonal. The negation of the relation ⊥ is called accessibility (ibid.),
written A 6⊥ B.
All of this show that our structure I resembles a non-distributive orthocom-
plete orthonormal lattice, and it is a Boolean lattice if we consider only the
closed qsets. Since every modular ortholattice is orthomodular [10, p. 15], it is
an open question whether our lattice has some similarity with modular lattices,
that is, A ≤ B entails A ⊔ (C ⊓ B) = (A ⊔ C) ⊓ B (we still need to check this
and other results).
4 Summing up
We resume here the properties of the quasi-lattice I = 〈P(U),0,1,⊓,⊔,⊥,≤〉:
(I-idempotency) A ⊓ A = A, A ⊔ A = A
(Commutativity) A ⊓ A = B ⊓A, A ⊔B = B ⊔ A
(Associativity) A ⊓ (B ⊓C) = (A ⊓B) ⊓ C, A ⊔ (B ⊔ C) = (A ⊔B) ⊔ C
(I-absorption) A ⊓ (A ⊔B) = A, A ⊔ (A ⊓B) = A
(I-minimum) 0 ⊓A = 0, 0 ⊔ A = A
(I-maximum) A ⊓ 1 = A, A ⊔ 1 = 1
(I-involution - 1) A⊥
⊥
= A
(I-involution - 2) A ≤ B ⇒ B⊥ ≤ A⊥
(Complementation) A ⊓ A⊥ = 0, A ⊔ A⊥ = 1
(I-absorption -1) A ⊔ (B ⊓B⊥) = A
(I-absorption-2) A ⊓ (B ⊔B⊥) = A
(I-De Morgan) (A ⊔B)⊥ = A⊥ ⊓B⊥, (A ⊓B)⊥ ⊆ A⊥ ⊔B⊥
(I-orthomodularity) A ⊔ (A ⊔B⊥)⊥ = B.
As we see, it is a rather unusual mathematical structure which resembles
the non-distributive ortholattice of quantum mechanics. What the specific I-
properties show is that sometimes we need to consider the closure of a certain
qset for getting the desired result. If we interpret the qsets of elements of U as
extensions of certain predicates, which might stand for physical properties, the
necessity of considering the closure of the qsets show that some fuzzy character-
istic of these properties are been shown. In fact, take for instance a qset A as
the extension of a certain property P , that is, A should stand for the collection
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of objects having the property P 7. Then, for instance, if we transform A twice
by the operation ⊥ (I-involution - 1), we do not obtain A anymore, but the qset
of the indiscernible of its elements. It seems that something is changed when
we operate with the collections of objects of the physical systems: we really
transform them, as we really do with quantum systems. But we remark that
the physical interpretation of such a structure and its consequences is still being
investigated. For the moment, let us keep with its mathematical counterpart
only.
5 The corresponding logic
In this section, we shall be dealing with the first ideas for an alternative axiom-
atization of a logic that has as its algebraic counterpart the I-lattice, based on
the above assumptions and definitions. We remark once more that this is only a
preliminary sketch, and maybe some modifications would need to be done, but
let us continue even so. As before, we shall be working within the theory Q.
The concepts introduced below, which mirror the standard ones, can be devel-
oped in the “standard part” of Q, so that we can use the usual mathematical
terminology. Here, as before, the equality symbol “=” stands for the extensional
equality of Q.
Let us take our algebra I = 〈P(U),0,1,⊓,⊔,⊥〉. Now we shall introduce a
generalized (or abstract) logic L = 〈F, T ,uprise,g,∼,։〉 in the sense of [4], and
we shall continue to use use → ∧, ∨, ¬, ∀ and ∃ as metalinguistic symbols
for implication, conjunction, disjunction, negation, the universal quantifier, and
the existential quantifier, respectively. The elements of the Q-set F will be
called formulas, and denoted by small Greek letters, while the elements of T
(T ⊆ P(F )) are the theories of L, and denoted by uppercase Greek letters
(indices can be used in both cases).
To begin with, let us see how we link such a logic with the quasi-lattice I.
Suppose that there is a valuation v : F 7→ P(U) such that:
(i) For any α ∈ F , v(α) ∈ P(U);
(ii) uprise and g are binary operations on F , and we denote the corresponding
images of the pair 〈α, β〉 respectively by αuprise β and αg β. These operations
obey the following rules:
(a) v(α uprise β) = v(α) ⊓ v(β)
(b) v(α g β) = v(α) ⊔ v(β);
(iii) ∼ is a mapping from F into F , and we define v(∼ α) = (v(α))⊥, for any
α ∈ F . This means that if v(α) = A, then v(∼ α) = U −A according to the
above definitions;
7By the way, this is something that is lacking in the usual discussion on quantum theories,
that is, a right “semantics”, which would enable us to talk of the extension of the relevant
predicates.
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(iv) F ∈ T , this is the trivial theory;
(v) If {Γi}i∈I is a collection of elements of T , then
⋂
Γi ∈ T .
It is clear that this definition is an algebraic characterization of our logic L
by means of the lattice I. Some immediate consequences of this definition are:
v(αuprise ∼ α) = 0, v(αg ∼ α) = 1, v(∼∼ α) = v(α), etc.
It is well known that in standard quantum logics there is an “implication-
problem”, to use Dalla Chiara et al.’s words [10, p. 164]. That is, all conditional
connectives “that can be reasonably introduced” in quantum logics are “anoma-
lous” (ibid.), and this was taken by some authors as a motive to criticize quan-
tum logics as not being “real logics”. As Dalla Chiara et al. say, there are some
conditions that a conditional would satisfy to be classified as an implication8.
These conditions are:
Conditions for an Implication
(i) identity, that is, α
∗
→ α, being
∗
→ the considered conditional;
(ii) modus ponens, that is, is α is true and α
∗
→ β is true, then β is true (op.
cit., p. 164);
(iii) In an algebraic semantics, a sufficient condition is: for any structure
A = 〈A, v〉, A |= α
∗
→ β iff v(α) ≤ v(β).
We say that a formula α is true in the structure I, and write I |= α iff
v(α) = 1, for any valuation v. In this case, I is a model of α. We write Γ |= α
to mean that every model of (the formulas of) Γ is model of α. Finally, α is
valid iff it is true in every structure which is an I-lattice. In this case, we write
|= α. It is quite obvious that our aim is to prove a completeness theorem for
our logic relative to the given semantic, but to do so we need to introduce the
concept of deduction from a set of premises. To begin the issue we shall finish
only in a forthcoming paper, let us define implication.
Definition 5.1 (I-conditional) α։ β =def β g (∼ αuprise ∼ β)
This conditional is quite similar to that one called “Dishkant implication”
in [23]. Using the above definitions and Theorem 3.1 (ii), it is immediate to see
that v(α։ β) = v(β) ∪ (v(α)⊥ ∩ v(β)⊥). Thus,
v(α։ α) = v(α) ∪ (v(α)⊥ ∩ v(α)⊥) = v(α) ∪ v(α)⊥ = 1 = 1,
8Really, several “quantum implications” can be defined, as shown in [22], [23], [27], but
we shall not continue with this discussion here. One of the first works (to our knowledge)
that proposed an axiomatization of the lattice of quantum mechanics is [16], in which other
conditionals are defined. We had no access to this paper, but know it from indirect sources,
namely, [11] and [28].
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for 1 = U is closed. So, |= α։ α. Furthermore, if v(α) = 1 and v(α։ β) = 1,
then v(β) ∪ (v(α)⊥ ∩ v(β)⊥) = 1 and, since v(α) = 1, we get that v(β) = 1.
Thus, our conditional obeys conditions (i) and (ii) of the Conditions for an
Implication. In addition, we can see that condition (iii) is also fulfilled. In fact,
by the hypothesis, we have |= α։ β, so v(βg (∼ αuprise ∼ β)) = 1. Call v(α) = A
and v(β) = B. Then B⊔ (A⊥ ⊓B⊥) = U , that is, B∪ (A⊥ ∩B⊥) = U . For this
equality to hold, we need that (A⊥ ∩B⊥) = B
⊥
= B⊥. Then A⊥ ∩B⊥ = B⊥,
so B⊥ ⊆ A⊥, that is (for Q-sets), A ⊆ B. By Theorem 3.9 (vi), A ≤ B, that is,
v(α) ≤ v(β).
Let us make a further remark on this definition. We say that A ∈ P(U) is
definable by a formula α ∈ F if v(α) = A. Let β be such that v(β) = A. Is there
such a β? The answer is in the affirmative. Since A ⊆ A, then v(α) ≤ v(β),
hence by condition (iii) above, |= α ։ β. So, β is any formula implied by
α. This affirmative makes sense, for v(α ։ β) = 1 and v(β) = A say that
A ⊔ (A⊥ ⊓ A⊥) = U , that is, A ∪ (A⊥ ∩A⊥) = A ∪ (A⊥ ∩ A⊥) = A ∪ A
⊥
= U .
This fact will be important for the definition of the connectives of the logic L.
Finally, let us say that αև։ β =def (α։ β)uprise (β ։ α).
Next we introduce the notion of syntactical consequence from a set of premises,
written Γ ⊢ α, as follows, where v(Γ) =
⋃
[v(α) : α ∈ Γ] (the terminology is
from Q – see again Section 2, if necessary).
Definition 5.2 (Syntactical Consequence) Γ ⊢ α iff any theory containing
Γ (really, the formulas of Γ) contains α.
Let ⊢ α abbreviates ∅ ⊢ α, while α ⊢ β abbreviates {α} ⊢ β (recall that they
are Q-sets, so the standard notation can be used), and Γ 6⊢ α says that it is not
the case that Γ ⊢ α. It is immediate to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 5.1 In L, we have
(i) α ∈ Γ⇒ Γ ⊢ α. In particular, α ⊢ α;
(ii) Γ ⊢ α⇒ Γ ∪∆ ⊢ α;
(iii) If Γ ⊢ α and for every β ∈ Γ, we have that ∆ ⊢ β, then ∆ ⊢ α;
(iv) If {Γi}i∈I is a family of subqsets of F such that for every α, α ∈ Γ ↔
Γi ⊢ α, then ∀α(α ∈
⋂
i∈I
Γi ↔
⋂
i∈I
Γi ⊢ α).
Proof: Immediate, for the definition of consequence is standard (see [4], [24]).
We shall not continue to develop the syntactical aspects of this logic (in
algebraic terms, but see [4]), but just try to link it with the semantic aspects
sketched above. The least theory containig α is denoted Tα, and it coincides
with the intersection of all theories containing α (op. cit.). Thus, Γ ⊢ α iff
v(α) ⊆ v(Tα). In particular, if Γ is a theory, that is, Cn(Γ) =def [α : Γ ⊢ α] = Γ,
then v(α) ⊆ v(Γ), and in particular v(α) ⊆ v(Γ). Finally, let us recall that since
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no deduction theorem holds in quantum logics [22], the same seems to happen
here due to the nature of our implication (but this is still a open problem).
The last point of this paper, which conduces us to another work, is the
question: how to characterize the logic L axiomatically? We shall follow the
approach of generalized logics in the sense of [4], but not here.
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